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Abstract
Falls are the most frequent adverse event in acute care hospitals. Although a large number of studies
have addressed the patients’ risk factors for falls and best practices in fall prevention, patients falls
still remain a major problem. This study applied a systemic methodology (Causal Analysis based on
STAMP (CAST)) to depict Ontario’s acute care hospital structure related to patient fall prevention.
The system’s component behaviours and interactions were described and deficits and inappropriate
control mechanisms among the system’s controllers were identified. As a result of the CAST
analysis, the complexity of the health care system, lack of a consistent and clear fall prevention
strategy, risk assessment tool and fall data analysis methodology, and effective communication
between the controllers were identified as potentially problematic. Suggestions were offered to
improve these gaps.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and literature review
It has been well documented that older adults commonly experience the occurrence of a
fall, which is a potentially devastating event that can lead to death or significant physical injuries
(Peterson et al., 1999; Ward-Griffin et al., 2004). Findings show that among communitydwelling older adults over 64 years of age, 28-35% fall each year. Of those who are 80 years or
older, approximately 50% experience a fall each year (Chisholm & Harruf, 2010). The frequency
and severity of falls increase with age and frailty level. According to Tideiksaar (2002), a fall
refers to ‘‘. . . any event in which a person inadvertently or unintentionally comes to rest on the
ground or another lower level such as a chair, toilet or bed.’’ (p. 15). In the year 2000, the direct
medical costs for fatal and non-fatal injuries related to falls among United States’ adults aged 65
years and older was $0.2 and $19 billion respectively (Stenens, Corso, Finkelstein & Miller,
2006). According to a SmartRisk (2010) report, in 2004, the direct health care costs from fallrelated injuries was $2 billion in Canada. The growing seniors’ population and the resulting cost
burden on the health care system are important reasons for conducting studies addressing issues
related to falls and the physical and emotional consequences of falling.
Not only do falls occur in the community, but falls are also frequent events in acute care
hospitals (Bates, Pruess, Souney, Platt, 1995). Fall rates in hospital settings vary from 2.9-13.0
per 1000 patient days (Titler, Shever, Kanak, Picone & Qin, 2011). According to Bates et al.
(1995), these falls account for a considerable proportion of injuries to patients as well as
increased length and cost of hospitalization. Pain, impaired function, anxiety, fear of falling, loss
of confidence and prolonged hospitalization have been reported as consequences for patients
who experience a fall in a hospital (Ireland, Kirkpatrick, Boblin & Robertson, 2012). The
prevention of falls among hospital patients is a priority within the Canadian patient safety
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movement (CIHI, 2011), since hospital falls and injuries have been ranked as the second most
common area of patient safety concern (Baker & Norton, 2002). The main focus of this research
study is hospital-based falls and the administrative structure in place in Ontario to prevent such
adverse events.
Most previous studies have focused on illuminating the risk factors for falls and developing
fall risk assessment tools. Recognizing risk factors helps to identify patients who are likely to
fall. Similar to a community setting, cognitive impairment, urinary incontinence, a high number
of medications, impaired mobility and a previous history of falls are the most commonly
identified risk factors for falls in a hospital setting (Oliver, Daly, Martin & McMurdo, 2004;
Bates et al., 1995). A number of multifaceted fall prevention strategies and best practices have
been introduced to improve the safety of patients and prevent falls among patients in hospitals
(Oliver, Connelly, Victor, Shaw, Whitehead, Genc …& Kurrle, 2007). However, falls continue
to be a major issue in this setting. Although addressing the risk factors for falls helps to reduce
the number of falls, information about a typical falls prevention program may help to improve
our understanding of the structural deficits in a complex system such as a hospital. A view of the
system-wide strategies and controls that have been put in place to minimize the occurrence of
falls in (Ontario) hospitals may improve prevention efforts.
For the present study, falls are understood as accidents where an accident is defined as “an
undesired or unplanned event that results in a loss, including loss of human life or human injury,
property damage, environmental pollution, etc.” (Leveson, 2011). Leveson (2011) argues that
until we do a better job of identifying the reasons for accidents, there will continue to be
unnecessary repetition of incidents and accidents. Different accident causation models exist,
however, two specific strategies for understanding the reasons for accidents/falls are relevant to
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the present work. As a trained (falls) investigator, I was initially involved in studying falls in an
acute care setting using the Systemic Falls Investigative Methodology (SFIM) (Zecevic,
Salmoni, Lewko & Vandervoort, 2007). However, for my thesis I have taken a different
perspective by making use of a model called by Leveson (2011) a Causal Analysis based on
STAMP (CAST), where STAMP refers to “Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes”.
Whereas SFIM takes a human error focus, CAST uses an engineering strategy and focuses on
system structure. Whereas the two strategies can (and will be) compared, the main focus of the
thesis will be to describe the control structure in place, as it relates to falls in a single acute care
hospital in Ontario. As such, a province-wide, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
(MOHLTC) lens will be applied.
While the Leveson’s CAST model will be used, the thesis will take a slightly more generic
approach. Normally Leveson and her students have used CAST to investigate single events such
as major accidents or incidents like the Walkerton water contamination disaster (Leveson,
Daouk, Dulac & Marais, 2003) or the friendly fire accident (Leveson, Allen & Storey, 2002).
This would be the first time that this model has been used to understand the underlying systemic
factors of patients’ falls. As stated above, falls in hospitals are a fairly frequent occurrence and as
such the present thesis has not taken a single fall event as the starting point, but rather hospital
falls in general. This is appropriate because the primary focus is the falls prevention program in
place for all falls. In addition, because CAST requires an investigator to consider all levels of the
(prevention) system in place, most/all of the upper levels of the prevention system are generic in
nature. In Ontario, the MOHLTC dictates that all hospitals have a falls prevention program in
place and the focus of the present thesis is the use of these programs in the system.
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Models Designed to Understand Accidents
This section provides a brief review of accident causation models (Figure 1). The earliest
accident causation models which came from industry safety (called occupational safety) placed
an emphasis on the factors connected to workers protection from injury, illness, and death. The
focus was on unsafe conditions and technological development in industrial accident prevention,
such as open blades and unprotected belts. As a result, the most obvious workplace hazards were
eliminated and the injuries started to diminish while technology became increasingly reliable.
The focus then shifted from unsafe conditions to unsafe acts (human error). Accidents began to
be considered as someone’s mistake rather than a condition that could have been prevented by
applying hazard removal in the workplace (Leveson, 2011; Hollnagel, 2004). Thus, accident
records guided our attention to human error analysis. The researchers moved into studies of the
management’s role organizing the work place for operators. It was found that it is necessary to
look at the decision errors at the management level. Figure 1 shows the development in the type
of accident causes during the last century. According to this, the main models of accident
causation are event-chain models and systemic models (Hollnagel, 2004). The following section
contains an explanation of these two different types of models and some examples of each model
to illustrate the differences as well as main areas of focus in each model.
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Accident

Technical
Failures
Human
Errors

Organisation
Failure

Others
Latent
Failure
Figure 1,
Developments in types of accident causes during the last century

Event-chain models
The most common accident models explain accidents in terms of cause-effect (root cause)
mechanisms. The occurrence process of accidents is considered as multiple sequential events in a
forward chain where each single cause leads to the next failure in the chain.
The first published general accident model was Heinrich’s Domino Model, published in
1931. According to Heinrich, an "accident" is one factor in a sequence that may lead to an injury
(Leveson, 2011). The factors can be visualized as a series of dominoes standing on edge; when
one falls, the linkage required for a chain reaction is completed (Figure 2). The model shows
how these factors constitute a sequence of events where the connection between cause and effect
is deterministic. Each of the factors are dependent on the preceding factor. According to
Heinrich’s model, a personal injury (the final domino) occurs only as a result of an accident and
an accident occurs only as a result of a personal or mechanical hazard. Personal and mechanical
hazards exist only through the fault of careless people or poorly designed or improperly
5

maintained equipment. This model has had a great influence in shifting the emphasis to human
errors in safety (Hollnagel, 2004).

Figure 2,
Heinrich's Domino Model of Accidents (Adopted from Heinrich’s Domino Model, 1931)
“Carelessness” is inherited or acquired as a result of the social environment. According to
Domino theory logic, an accident can be prevented if one or more of the dominos are prevented
from falling or in other ways removed. Bird and Loftus extended Heinrich’s Domino Model in
1976 (Bird & Loftus, 1976) by including management decisions to encompass the influence of
management in the cause and effect of accidents. They argued that lack of management control
permits the basic causes (personal and job factors) to happen. Basic causes lead to immediate
causes (unsafe condition/act) which are the proximate reason of an accident; and an accident
results in a loss. This modified sequence can be applied to every accident and is of basic
importance to loss control management.
The Domino model was replaced by Reason 20 years later (Reason, 2000). He called it the
Swiss cheese model. This model emphasizes the important role of system defences and illustrates
6

how defences, barriers and safeguards (represented by aligned slices of Swiss cheese) within an
organization may be breached by a potential error. According to Reason, each defensive layer of
the Swiss cheese model represents the safety barriers of an organization. Intact defensive layers
are ideal. An accident does not happen unless the holes in all of the layers momentarily line up
allowing an accident to occur (Figure 3). The Swiss cheese model focuses on human errors in
order to learn how to redesign the system to reduce losses.

Latent Failures

Organizational
Effects
Unsafe
supervision
Precondition

Active Failures

Unsafe Acts

Failed
Defences

Accident

Figure 3,
Reason’s Swiss cheese model of accident causal chain (Adopted from Reason, 1990)
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Systemic models
The systemic accident causation models stem from control theory (Sheridan, 1992); chaos
theory and stochastic resonance systemic models (Hollnagel, 2004). These theories explain
accidents on the level of the system as a whole rather than on the level of specific cause-effect
mechanisms in event-chain models. In this model, accidents are emergent phenomena which are
“normal” in the sense of being something that derived from typical work practice. Although
there obviously still must be a temporal flow of events showing the beginning of an accident’s
progression and the end of its development, each event may proceed or be followed by several
events. In other words, the causal relationship between the events is not required to be direct and
linear (Hollnagel, 2004). There are a number of systemic accident causation models in different
areas such as aviation, transportation and patient safety.
Systemic Falls Investigative Methodology (SFIM) is one example of a systemic method
limited to fall investigation. Based on Reason’s Swiss cheese model (explained above) and work
by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the SFIM was developed by Zecevic et al., (2007)
to provide an in-depth understanding of seniors’ falls. SFIM is a systemic methodology of
accident investigation and causation with seniors’ falls as the main focus. The SFIM model
adopted the Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology (ISIM) which was developed by the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada in 1998.
Another example of a systemic model of accident causation is the System-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) model developed in 2004 by Nancy Leveson at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology as part of system safety engineering. In STAMP,
dysfunctional component interactions and external disturbances are the sources of accidents as
well as component failure. Therefore, accidents occur when there is “inadequate control or
8

enforcement of safety-related constraints on the development, design, and operation of the
system” (Leveson, 2011; p. 75). In other words, inadequate control can lead to an accident.
Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) is an approach to accident analysis which was
introduced by Leveson.
The detailed explanation of SFIM and CAST is provided in the next section to fully
understand the steps of accident analysis in each methodology.

SFIM

To provide an in-depth understanding of seniors’ falls as accidents, Zecevic et al., (2007)
adopted the Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology (ISIM) which was developed by the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada in 1998. The ISIM is used to provide in-depth
information about transportation occurrences by investigating them. The adaptation of ISIM
named the Systemic Falls Investigation Methodology (SFIM) offers a protocol for the
investigation of seniors’ falls by applying the following six steps:
1- Planning and collecting data about the occurrence of falls by using F-SHEL (Faller,
Software, Hardware, Environment and Liveware).
2- Creating a sequences of events and identifying safety- significant events.
3- Evaluating the types of errors and failures by using Generic Error Modeling System
(GEMS).
4- Applying the unsafe acts and unsafe conditions in context by using the Swiss Cheese
Model.
5- Identifying safety deficiencies and assessing the risk.
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6- Providing safety action suggestions.
In the first step, the planning of data collection starts by investigators as soon as possible
after the occurrence of a fall. The investigators apply SHEL tool to collect the needed data. The
original data collection tool, SHEL, was developed by Edwards (1972). SHEL was modified by
Hawkins (1993) to help investigators in gathering appropriate information and facts regarding an
accident. According to the F-SHEL data collection tool, planning is directed by focusing on five
components: the faller, records and documents (software), equipment (hardware), environmental
conditions (environmental), and people who were directly or indirectly involved in or
contributing to the incidence of the fall (liveware). In-depth interviews are used to collect data
from the people who were directly or indirectly involved in the fall, especially the faller, to
provide relevant information. Also, observation and examination of hardware and environmental
factors, review of written material, and event reconstruction provide information regarding the
fall. Accident data collection is out of the scope of this research study since the main focus is the
analysis of existing information rather than investigating a particular event.
The second step in a fall investigation is to provide a logical, sequential and meaningful
arrangement of information based on the material collected during the first step. The event chain
is constructed using available information and has a logical flow. The sequence of events is the
entry point to analyze data and identify safety significant events. Safety significant events are
potential events which reveal unsafe acts/conditions. Four main questions can guide investigators
to identify safety significant events: is the event undesirable? Is the event/act non-standard? Is
the event/act linked or potentially linked as an antecedent to another undesirable event? And are
there any other alternative actions or options available to prevent the unsafe event/act?
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The third step in the SFIM protocol is analyzing the safety significant events using GEMS.
GEMS was suggested by Rasmussen (1987) as a human error taxonomy framework and three
years later it was revised by Reason (1987, 1990). GEMS establishes links between human error
and underlying contributors by recognizing the types of error and behavioural antecedents. The
outcome of the third step in SFIM facilitates identifying the types of committed errors and makes
the unsafe actions clear. This analysis illuminates whether the action (unsafe act or decision) was
intentional or unintentional. Errors of execution explain the unintentional actions, whereas errors
of planning (action is executed well but poorly planned) are intentional action indicators. Less
effective motor control and frequent memory failures are characteristics of the aging process
which expose older adults to unintentional unsafe actions.
The fourth step is identifying unsafe acts, preconditions, supervision and organizational
factors using the Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation (Figure 4). Unsafe acts
explain characteristics of the fall such as the location of fall and the fall itself; what was the
mindset of the faller and so on. Preconditions for an unsafe act include internal and external risk
factors of falls in the elderly (i.e. medication, impaired mobility). Supervision consists of two
components: informal supervision such as family and friends, and formal supervision such as
nurses and physicians. Organizational factors relate to factors connected to service providers and
policy makers such as government. Holes in the different layers of the Swiss cheese represent
active failures or latent conditions that can be dynamically modified in response to local
situations (Reason, 2000). When holes line up, an accident occurs. According to Reason’s Swiss
Cheese Model, the holes in different layers represent active failures or latent conditions. The
local conditions can influence the failures’ that can change over time. For instance, in the SFIM
analysis, lack of formal supervision may not contribute to an oriented patient’s fall. However,
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lack of supervision can be identified as a contributing factor to the fall of a person who is
disoriented. Thus the holes in different layers of the Swiss Cheese Model are constantly being
modified in response to the situation. Accidents do not happen unless holes in different layers
line up (Figure 4).
After analyzing safety significant events and unsafe conditions and identifying causal
factors, the next step is determining which of these events has the potential threat for an adverse
event and how properly the existing defenses are designed. The level of risk is assessed for each
event during the fifth step.

Figure 4,
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation adopted for SFIM (Zecevic et al., 2007)

Introducing the safety actions happens in the last step of the falls investigation since
identifying safety deficiencies and suggesting the appropriate defense mechanisms is the goal of
an incident investigation.
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Zecevic et al. (2009) applied SFIM to identify safety deficiencies that contributed to falls
in community-dwelling older adults. They investigated fifteen falls of community-dwelling
seniors in London, Ontario, Canada. The findings of the study demonstrated that there is a need
to study seniors’ falls with a systems approach rather than focusing solely on assessing the risk
factors of falling (Zecevic, Salmoni, Lewko, Vandervoort, &Speechley, 2009).

CAST

Leveson (2004) developed STAMP as an accident causation model based on basic systems
theory. In systems theory, accidents are emergent from the interactions between system
components rather than single causal factors. In STAMP, systems are viewed as components that
are kept in a state of dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information and control. Control
is associated with the imposition of constraints and feedback provides information about the
actual state of the control process. Thus, continuous control and feedback in a complex system is
vital to avoid any inconsistencies and hazards. A system is not static; it is dynamic, constantly
adapting to achieve its goals and to respond to changes in the system itself and its environment.
STAMP shifts the focus in system safety from preventing failures to enforcing the appropriate
safety constraints or controls.
In STAMP, accidents occur when the control system fails to properly handle external
disturbances, component failures, or dysfunctional interactions among system components.
Safety is viewed as a control problem and safety is managed by a hierarchical control structure
driven by an adaptive socio-technical system (Rasmussen, 1997). The main goal of this
hierarchical control structure is to enforce constraints on system design, development and
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operation. Designing a control structure that will enforce the necessary constraints helps to
prevent future accidents.
The basic concepts in STAMP are: constraints, hierarchical control structures, and control
loops and process models. The most basic concept in Leveson’s STAMP model is constraints
rather than an event. The lack of constraints imposed on the operation of the system at each level
of a socio-technical system may cause an accident (or in this case a patient fall in a hospital).
Systems are defined as hierarchical control structures where each level of the hierarchy enforces
constraints on the activity at lower levels of the hierarchy. Safety is an emergent property which
is the result of successful imposition of these constraints from one level to the next level. Based
on systems theory, the interaction between system components that violates the hierarchical
safety control structure is another reason for accidents.
The hierarchical control structure in Leveson’s STAMP model is derived from the sociotechnical model of system operation introduced by Rasmussen in 1997 (Figure 5). Rasmussen’s
model of system operation involves the control of safety in a dynamic society and uses a controlbased model at the social and organisational levels. Rasmussen discussed that, in a very fast
paced, constantly changing, technological era, complex systems and workers are forced to
constantly adapt to various pressures (e.g., productivity, cost cutting measures, etc.). Hollnagel
(2004) refers to these pressures as the efficiency-thoroughness trade off (ETTO). These pressures
can cause the organizational behaviour to migrate towards the boundary of unsafe behaviour.
Rasmussen (1997) discussed that humans in any system behave according to the system’s
objectives often changing their behaviour (adapting) in order to improve productivity. These
adaptations and changes often remain unnoticed until an accident occurs. Rasmussen (1997)
argued that the workers’ performance change should be understood as adaptation to new
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situations rather than workers’ errors. In the Walkerton water supply disaster, many adaptations
to the water testing process/system had occurred because of the pressures imposed by the severe
cost cutting measures taken by the provincial government (Leveson et al., 2003). Unfortunately
these adaptations were not identified until after people became ill from the contaminated water.
In the hierarchical control structure of any complex system, there are control processes
between levels of the system. The control processes enforce safety constraints to control the
actions at each level in the hierarchy. According to Leveson (2011), missing constraints,
inadequate safety control commands, commands that were not performed correctly at a lower
level, or insufficient communication or feedback about constraint enforcement are the possible
reasons for inadequate control at each level of the hierarchical structure.

15

Figure 5,
Rasmussen Socio-Technical model of system operation (Rasmussen, 1997)

According to Leveson (2011), every controller (automated or human) at different levels of
the hierarchical structure must contain a process model to control a process in a control loop. A
standard control loop is shown in Figure 6. The four important conditions to control a process
are: a goal, an action condition (control channels), an observability condition (feedback), and a
model condition (process model). An example in the water safety control structure at the time of
the Walkerton water accident will assist to make the process clearer (Figure 6). The Walkerton
Public Utilities Commission (WPUC) was responsible for operating the Walkerton water system,
16

acting as the controller to oversee operations to ensure that water quality was not compromised.
The WPUC operations were responsible for measuring the well’s chlorine residuals (measured
variables or feedback) and applying adequate chlorine (controlled variable) to kill bacteria. The
main goal of the control loop was to provide safe drinking water for Walkerton. Usually,
accidents occur when the process model used by the controller does not match the controlled
process. In the Walkerton case, there was a lack of training on drinking water safety and as a
result a poor understanding of the water treatment process.

Controller

Process
Model

Control
Actions

Feedback

Controlled Process

Figure 6,
A simple control loop (Adopted from Leveson, 2011)

Leveson (2011) introduced an accident analysis technique based on STAMP, called CAST
which helps to understand why accidents occur. The entire sociotechnical system design is
examined using CAST to recognize the weaknesses in the existing safety control structure. The
CAST analysis normally relies on previously reported information about the occurrence (e.g., in
the Walkerton case there were thousands of pages of court documents) and does not include a
formal accident investigation. Indeed, information is gained through any source available,
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including newspapers, government documents, etc. Analyzing an accident using STAMP is a
matter of putting all three basic concepts (constraints, hierarchical control structures, and control
loops) together in one diagram of the total control structure. The procedure for CAST includes
the following nine steps.


“Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) involved in the loss.



Identify the system safety constraints and system requirements associated with the
hazard.



Document the safety control structure in place to control the hazard and enforce the
safety constraints. This structure includes the roles and responsibilities of each
component in the structure as well as the controls provided or created to execute their
responsibilities and the relevant feedback provided to them to help them do this. This
structure may be completed in parallel with the later steps.



Determine the proximate events leading to the loss.



Analyze the loss at the physical system level. Identifying the contribution of each of
the following to the events: physical and operational controls, physical failures,
dysfunctional interactions, communication and coordination flaws, and unhandled
disturbances. Determine why the physical controls in place were ineffective in
preventing the hazard.



Moving up the levels of the safety control structure, determine how and why each
successive higher level allowed or contributed to the inadequate control at the current
level. For each system safety constraint, either the responsibility for enforcing it was
never assigned to the component or components did not exercise adequate control to
ensure their assigned responsibilities (safety constraints) were enforced in the
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components below them. Any human decisions or flawed control action need to be
understood in terms of (at least): the information available to the decision maker as
well as any required information that was not available, the behaviour-shaping
mechanisms (the context and influences on the decision-making process), the value
structures underlying the decision, and any flaws in the process models of those
making the decisions and why those flows existed.


Examine overall coordination and communication contributors to the loss.



Determine the dynamics and changes in the system and the safety control structure
relating to the loss and any weakening of the safety control structure over time.



Generate recommendations.” (Leveson, 2011; p.350)

According to Leveson (2004), STAMP requires users to think based on systems theory and
to consider environmental and behaviour shaping factors during an accident analysis. For
example, lack of knowledge and training of the Walkerton commissioners and environmental
officers were identified as contributing factors in the Walkerton water contamination accident in
May 2000. They were unaware that E. coli was potentially fatal and their knowledge affected
their behaviour in providing water safety. Leveson (2004) discussed that accidents are the result
of a complex process which results in the system behaviour violating the safety constraints. The
control loops between different levels of the hierarchical control structure enforce the safety
constraints during design, development and operation. Based on the STAMP causality model,
one or more of the following must have occurred if there is an accident:
1- The controller fails to enforce the safety constraint.
a. The suitable control actions necessary to apply the related safety constraint were not
provided.
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b. The suitable control actions were provided but too soon or too late or stopped too
soon.
c. Unsafe control actions were provided that caused the safety constraint violation.
2- Suitable control actions were provided but not followed.
The STAMP accident causation model has been used to analyze many major accidents
such as public water supply contamination in the small town of Walkerton, Ontario (Leveson et
al., 2003), and a friendly fire accident in Iraq (Leveson, Allen & Storey, 2002). The results of
CAST analysis showed the systemic causes of accidents and the underlying accident processes as
well as making recommendations that do not simply ﬁx symptoms but eliminate the root causes.

Understanding the Reasons Behind Adverse Events
The accident causation model used to analyze an adverse event should encourage and
guide a comprehensive analysis at multiple technical and social system levels (Leveson, 2011).
The method used to understand or analyze events may affect the findings. There are similarities
and differences between SFIM and CAST which may cause differences in the analysis of the
same accident. SFIM (stemming from Reason’s Swiss Cheese accident causal model) and CAST
(based on Leveson’s STAMP accident model) both strive to create approaches to safety based on
modern system thinking and systems theory. Clarifying some of these differences may help
explain the approach taken with this thesis.
SFIM is an accident causation methodology which focuses on falls as adverse events in a
systemic approach. SFIM considers active failures, preconditions, supervision and organizational
failures in describing the contributing factors to falls. Rather than looking for individual “holes”
in system barriers, CAST forces the investigator to describe the entire system and its parts,
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including a government’s role. Fairly similar to SFIM, CAST considers technical (including
hardware and software), human and organizational factors in complex socio-technical systems.
Leveson (2011) outlines that the STAMP model of accident causation can be applied to any
complex, sociotechnical system such as health care (Leveson, 2011).
Analysing error type and failure mode using GEMS is one of the steps of the SFIM
accident causation methodology. The error analysis in SFIM illuminates the fact that the main
focus is on human errors as potential causes. In SFIM, human errors are identified in a sequence
of events as active failures which result in a person falling. Although the GEMS model was
developed by Rasmussen in 1987, ten years later he argued (Rasmussen, 1997) that a shift was
needed from a focus in explaining the role of human errors in accidents to one emphasizing
instead the factors that shape human behaviour. He recommended focusing on the mechanisms
generating human behaviour in a dynamic context rather than on human errors and violations of
the rules. He argued that breaking down the behaviour into actions or events causes the isolation
of the phenomenon from the context in which the behaviour happens. Such an approach suggests
controlling behaviour by identifying the boundaries of safe performance. This is made possible
by knowing the safe boundaries explicitly, by having the chance to develop coping skills at the
boundaries, by designing the system to support safe adaptation in response to pressure, by
identifying potentially dangerous outcomes of individual decisions, by planning for error
tolerance, and by neutralizing the pressures that caused the safety constraint violations
(Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2011).
Systems are not static. The dynamic interaction of workplace circumstances makes the
relationship between the systems components’ behaviours and collaboration challenging. All
humans involved in the system adapt to difficulties and re-shape their behaviour to meet the
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demands of their job (Woods and Dekker, 2000). According to Woods and Dekker (2000), the
introduction of new technology and changes causes workers to create new ways of doing things.
Therefore the reality of technological change is transformation and adaptation. Adaptation is a
phenomenon that happens when the work place situation, motivation and pressure changes for
the workers. All the accident causation approaches that aim to enhance safety of complex and
dynamic systems must account for adaptation. Rasmussen has argued that major accidents are
often caused by a systemic migration of organizational behaviour to the boundaries of safe
behaviour under pressure in a competitive environment. Due to work pressures and resulting
adaptations, attempts to produce an effective safety culture will never end. Rasmussen argues
that human adaptations are only viewed as “errors” when accidents are viewed retrospectively. A
good example of this in a hospital setting is the work adaptations made by nurses on a unit that is
short staffed. To maintain productivity (within an efficiency thoroughness trade-off situation)
workers will adapt normal practice to deal with the high workload, often “juggling” many
patients simultaneously. Indeed, under most conditions these workers will be praised for their
high productivity. Only following an incident is this productivity seen as an error. This error
labelling is referred to as hindsight bias (Woods & Dekker, 2000). STAMP focuses on the
pressures that drive decision makers to violate safe practices instead of trying to identify human
errors (Leveson, 2011), and importantly seeks to understand the control structures in place to
manage safety
In each control loop at each level of the hierarchical control structure a missing or
inadequate constraint on the process at a lower level or inadequate implementation of the
constraint leads to violation which can cause ineffective/unsafe behaviour. Since each
component of the system may involve insufficient control, analysis starts by testing each of the
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general control loop components and assessing their potential involvement: (1) the controller
may provide insufficient or inappropriate control actions, including insufficient supervision of
failures or disturbances in the physical process; (2) control actions may be inadequately
performed, or (3) there may be missing or insufficient feedback. Two American Black Hawk
helicopters and all their occupants were fired on and destroyed by an American Air Force F-15 in
the Iraqi no-fly zone in 1994. The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft was
acting as an air traffic control tower in the sky and providing surveillance and control for the
aircraft in the area. Not providing the proper command to F-15 (the helicopter must not be
identified as a threat) is an example of an inadequate control action by AWACS. Also, the F-15
lead pilot must not fire on the helicopters without identifying them properly. (He did not check
the helicopter identification by a second pass). Inadequate feedback involved in the friendly fire
accident was the limited signals from the helicopters to the AWACS due to the mountainous area
and narrow line of sight.
These same general factors apply at each level of the socio-technical control structure, but
the interpretations (applications) of the factors at each level may diﬀer. The control processes
may vary in different layers of the safety control structure. The higher-level control process may
present only general goals and constraints while the lower level control processes may include
many details to achieve the general and local goals in the immediate conditions. For instance, in
the friendly fire accident (Leveson et al., 2002), the Mission Director’s responsibility (as a higher
level component) was having the complete awareness about the status of all aircraft in the area of
the mission and commanding to stop targeting the helicopters. Lower level components such as
pilots are involved in very detailed control actions close to the accident. The connection between
identified contributing factors (hazards) at each safety barrier layer of the Swiss cheese model of
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SFIM is not tested to identify the linking between them. For instance, lack of an informal support
network and consistent medical follow up were identified as two contributing factors of a
patient’s fall (the fall case will be discussed below) at the supervision level of the Swiss Cheese
model. The potential connection between these two contributing factors is not dealt with directly
in the SFIM accident analysis. In contrast, CAST looks for effective coordination and
communication channels between the hierarchical levels of the system as well as within the
hierarchical levels. According to Rasmussen (1997), lack of vertical integration and
communication is a major threat to an effective safety structure. Communication includes both
exchange of information and feedback. The downward reference channel provides the necessary
information to enforce constraints on lower levels and the upward measuring channel provides
feedback in Leveson’s model of accident causation. In addition to communication, feedback is
necessary in providing adaptive control in any open system (Leveson, 2004).

Purpose of the Present Study
Patients’ falls are among the most common reported adverse events in clinical settings
(Hill, Hoffman, Hill, Oliver, Beer, McPhail … & P.Haines, 2010; Shorr, Mion, Chandler,
Rosenblatt, Lynch & Kessler, 2008). For example, 2.9-13.0 per 1000 patient days is the reported
rate of falls in hospitals (Titler et al., 2011). The importance of patient fall prevention for every
caregiver in clinical settings has led to many research studies in this area. Although a large
number of studies have addressed patients’ risk factors for falls and best practices in fall
prevention, patients falls still remain a major problem in the acute care hospital setting.

24

It would be advantageous to identify the systemic risk factors for falls by looking at
system-wide fall prevention strategies and controls. The main purpose of this thesis is to depict
Ontario’s health care and an acute care hospital’s structure (in Ontario) related to patients fall
prevention strategies, to examine the system’s components behaviours and interactions, and to
identify deficits and inappropriate control mechanisms among the system’s controllers. This
holistic approach to review the health care system’s dynamics and connections to reduce patient
falls will assist in addressing the system’s deficits and optimizing patients’ safety in the future.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
A single fall at an acute care hospital, investigated using the SFIM methodology, was used
as a starting point for this study. Whereas the SFIM methodology allows for the study of
“organizational” factors (in the Swiss Cheese model) there is no prescription requiring the
investigator to explore and describe the entire socio-technical system in question. In contrast, the
CAST methodology dictates that the entire socio-technical system surrounding an accident be
mapped out, so that the control structures can be described and understood. Using CAST, data is
gathered by various techniques to map out the system in place to control adverse events (in this
case falls in a hospital). All the existing cases in a web-based SFIM database related to hospitals’
falls were reviewed (it is important to note that the present author helped with the investigation
of some of these falls). Each occurrence report in the SFIM data base includes information about
demographics of falls and fallers, a summary of the fall event, a sequence of events, unsafe
events, human errors, contributing factors and conclusions. Since each case has a different
amount of information available due to the nature of the falls investigations, the case judged to
have the most complete data in the database was selected for this research study. The inclusion
criterion was a fall that happened in the hospital setting and had the richest information available.
The information about the faller, contributing factors of the fall related to the faller and his
environment were obtained by reviewing the SFIM database.
In line with the main goal of the present research study, Ontario’s health care safety control
structure relevant to the prevention of patient falls was studied. Roughly, the control structure
begins with the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, running down through the Local Health
Integration Networks to an individual hospital. Since the whole control structure in place was
examined, the CAST-driven analysis used here did not illuminate the reasons for a particular
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patient fall in an acute care hospital, but rather, attempted to explain the deficits in the system
relevant to the patient fall prevention strategies used by the hospital in question.
This research study received ethics approval from the Research Ethics Board at the
University of Western Ontario in order to review and use the existing data in the SFIM data base.
All steps applied to fully understand how falls prevention strategies are prescribed in an
acute care hospital are described below. Since many of the prevention strategies used are
responses to government policy and best practices, there will be some commonality from
hospital to hospital in Ontario. In this thesis, the approach to the analysis of the health care
system was adopted from a research study by Leveson, Couturier, Thomas, Dierks, Wierz, Psaty,
and Finkelstein (2012). Leveson et al., (2012) used the CAST accident analysis to understand
deficits in the health care system related to drug safety in United States. They examined the
overall pharmaceutical safety control structure to determine the main components of the system
and their behaviour and interactions. A complete analysis of an adverse event in accordance with
the CAST process described above, adapted for the present study (Leveson et al., 2012), and
contained the following steps:
1. An explanation of Ontario’s health care system’s goals regarding patient fall prevention
strategies.
2. An explanation of the system and potential hazard(s) involved in a fall.
3. A description of the system safety constraints and system requirements related to falls.
4. A description of the health care hierarchical safety control structure that attempts to
prevent patients’ falls. To map out what exists presently, a static model of the system
control structure is required. This static model of health care safety control structure
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related to fall prevention shows the entire system in the form of a hierarchy in which each
higher level imposes constraints on the action(s) of the lower level beneath it.
5. A gap analysis to provide information about the state of different components of the
control structure. In a gap analysis the controllers and their control actions which were
explained in the static model (a step before the gap analysis) will be examined to identify
potentially problematic areas. The controlled processes will be tested to recognize
whether the controllers are able to perform effectively under the specific work conditions.
The detailed information is provided in the gap analysis step.
6. Finally, recommendations to improve falls prevention in an acute care hospital will be
made.
This research study looked at the health care hierarchical control structure in Ontario
relevant to the fall prevention strategies at the time of a patient’s fall in an acute care hospital.
An investigated and analyzed fall (using SFIM) in an acute care hospital was used to start the
CAST analysis (A copy of the SFIM accident causation analysis is included in Appendix A).
Information about the higher levels of the health care control structure related to fall prevention
was required to conduct the CAST analysis. Therefore, the principal investigator gathered
information about the system itself, identified the different system controllers that have relevance
to patient fall prevention, and specified how the controllers interact with each other. A primary
source of information was the public information provided in official organizational websites.
The policies and standards were identified through the information on the websites (see
Appendix B). The accountability agreement between the Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care (MOHLTC) and Local Health Integrated Network (LHIN) was reviewed, as well as their
performance agreement in order to fully comprehend the collaboration relationship between the
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two organizations. Also, the LHIN- Hospital services accountability agreement (which was
available on-line) was read to learn about the hospital’s funding allocations and accountability
indicators.
Additional fact finding was performed by the principal investigator through phone calls
and emails to health care staff within the hierarchy. Staff members in different organizations who
agreed to participate were asked questions about their role and responsibilities in patient fall
prevention. Unlike the SFIM methodology where a template on how to collect information is
provided, there is no designated procedure for doing this within the CAST methodology. Perhaps
the best way to describe the investigation is that of an investigative reporter. When questions
about the control structure arose attempts to contact relevant staff were made. As suggested in
the Leveson et al. (2012) study, for various reasons it was not always possible to collect
complete information. An accepted limitation of the present investigation, as well as the SFIM
methodology is the fact that people often refuse to answer questions or simply do not reply to
email requests. Despite the principal investigator’s efforts to contact all individuals within
various organizations who likely possessed the most relevant information about the fall
prevention strategies in the health care system, she was not able to make contact with all the
desired contacts. The following positions and departments were contacted:
-

Health System Accountability and Performance division at the MOHLTC,

-

Best Practice Guideline Manager at the Registered Nurses Association of Ontario
(RNAO),

-

Policy Analyst at RNAO,

-

Health Services Research Specialist at Accreditation Canada,

-

Program Development department at Accreditation Canada,
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-

Financial Reporting and Funding department at the LHIN,

-

Falls Program Lead at the LHIN.

Following a lengthy data gathering period (6-8 months), the hierarchical control structure
was depicted using the information obtained from various staff members, as well as from
organizational charts from the hospital and the MOHLTC.
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Chapter 3: Case Study Accident Description
The fall chosen took place in an acute care hospital and caused some minor injuries to a
stroke survivor. The patient, an older adult fell to the ground on May 17, 2012 at 15:55. The
stroke unit’s physiotherapist assisted the patient to the washroom in his room after an afternoon
physiotherapy session. The patient was able to walk with his walker but required assistance and
supervision by at least one other person. The patient left his walker just outside the washroom
door and before leaving him the physiotherapist reminded the patient to call his nurse using the
call bell in the washroom when he wanted to return to his bed. The faller used the call bell to call
for help but after five minutes of waiting became impatient and decided to transfer to his bed
independently. He stepped out of the washroom and grabbed onto his walker. As he started
walking his foot hit the walker and he tripped over the walker. He lost his balance and fell
forward onto the ground. His nurse came into his room and noticed the faller on the floor. She
rushed to the room’s doorway and called for assistance from other nurses nearby. Two other
nurses arrived and helped the patient into his bed. The patient was assessed for injuries and some
bruises were found.
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Figure 7,
Left: the washroom in patient’s bedroom. Right: The patient’s walker
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Chapter 4: Using CAST
This chapter presents the CAST analysis of the Ontario-based system designed to prevent
patient falls, like the one described above, in an acute care hospital.

Step 1: System Definition and its Goals
Understanding the goals of any studied system is essential to realize its purpose and to
evaluate how well it meets its objectives. The federal government, the ten provinces, and the
three territories create Canada’s health care system. The provinces and territories administer a
collection of plans under the “Canada Health Act”, each differing from the other in some sense
but similarly designed to meet national principles. The main objective of the health care system
is “to ensure that all residents have reasonable access to medically necessary hospital and
physician services, on a rapid basis” (Health Canada, 2010).
It is acknowledged that the focus of this thesis is fall prevention strategies in Canada’s
health care system, specially an acute care hospital in Ontario. Thus, the system goals regarding
patient fall prevention can be defined as:
1.

Identifying hospital patients at risk of falling.

2. Developing and implementing effective fall prevention strategies.
a. The appropriate organizations are assigned to develop and implement the strategies.
b.

Updated scientific knowledge is provided.

3. Ensuring the fall prevention strategies are appropriate to address a patient’s safety
needs and to prevent falls (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2011).
There are many different types of hospitals such as acute, community and rehabilitation
hospitals. However, for the present research study the acute-care-hospital setting (where the
33

reported fall occurred) was studied. Acute care hospitals provide complex care for patients
(Hospital Report, 2007). In the acute care hospital’s goal map, it was found that the final goal as
a part of the health care system is: “To achieve excellence in patient care and safety, to provide
the best patient and family experience, to transform by new discoveries and innovations, and to
collaborate with partners to provide an integrated system of patient care.” According to the goals
of the hospital, patient safety is central to high quality care. Employing best practices that align
with the quality and patient safety framework is essential to attaining the highest quality of care.
Best practices for health care professionals refer to the best evidence-based interventions
available from the research (Hartford Center of Geriatric Nursing Excellence, 2012). The fact
that an acute care hospital consists of many different units (e.g., pediatrics, stroke, and
neurology) and different patients with various conditions poses several challenges for falls
prevention. For example, patients presenting with dementia are more prone to fall than nondemented patients (Shaw, 2002). The present reality for Ontario hospitals is the goal of
attempting to minimize the number of falls that occur.

Step 2: System Hazard Identification
In some socio-technical systems like aviation and transportation systems, a hazard is
perceived as something in the environment. For example, a mountain in the path of the aircraft is
a hazard. Leveson (2011) argued that in System Safety, a hazard is defined as both
environmental and within the designed system and not just in its environment. For instance,
flying too close to a mountain would be a hazard also. According to Leveson (2011, p.184), a
hazard is defined as “A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of
worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss).”
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The system level hazards associated with patient falls are:
H1. Patient supervision is not continuous.
1. Nurses provide care for multiple patients often necessitating multi-tasking often under
“ETTO” conditions (Kalisch & Aebersold, 2010). According to Hollnagel (2004),
human error is not a useful theory to explain accidents. He argued that normal work
performance often consists of a number of trade-offs between efficiency and
thoroughness (ETTO principle). Hollnagel believes that these trade-offs are learned
and effective. Accidents can be preventable if the normal human performances and
the conditions in which the trade-offs occur are investigated (Hollnagel, 2004). Given
that health care expenditures in Ontario are considered to be very high and hospitals
in Ontario currently operate under very strick budgetary conditions, this practice is
likely to continue (Drummond & Burleton, 2010).
2. Patients span 24 hours in a patient day, nurses work in shifts of less than 24 hours.
3. Patient needs are variable across patients and across time.
4. Monitoring of patient needs (e.g., a call bell system) is not always reliable.
H2. Best practices for and implementation of falls prevention is not perfect.
1. The specifics of falls prevention protocols are not dictated for hospitals.
2. Best practices do not always exist (lack of research clarity).
3. Adverse event reporting and analysis of fall events is not perfect.
4. Not all risk assessment tools are valid and reliable (Scott, Votova, Scanlan & Close,
2007).
H3. Patients have many conditions that affect balance and their risk of falls (Bates et al., 1995).
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1. Some patients arrive being fall prone as a secondary condition to the primary reason
for hospital admission.
2. Surgery/treatment often has after effects.
3. Many admission conditions directly and severely impact balance and strength (e.g.,
strokes).
4. Patients’ conditions are not constant.
H4. Patients do not always follow care instructions.
1. A patient’s bodily needs (urination) often pre-empt safety concerns (Maslow, 1954).
2. Patients often have cognitive/mental conditions that interfere with logical
thinking/problem solving (e.g., older patients often have dementia).
Falls are a very common accident in hospitals (Hill et al., 2010; Shorr et al., 2008). A
patient’s fall can be identified as a hazard itself and system design should not let the hazard exist.
However, it is likely not possible to control all falls considering the variety of patients’ and
environmental conditions. The patient related factors such as dementia are out of the control of
the health care system. According to Leveson et al, (2012) “There is nothing in the world that is
totally safe under all conditions” (p. 395). Therefore, it is important to create a safe health care
system which attempts to control the possible hazards and decreases the probability of fall
related hazards as much as is possible.

Step 3: System Safety Constraints and Requirements
The system level constraints required to address (i.e., prevent) the aforementioned hazards
are:
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1- The work place circumstances such as nurses multi-tasking need to be considered to
provide the most efficient care/supervision for the patients. The fall prevention strategies
and best practices need to reflect the ETTO condition.
2- Health care policies for falls prevention need to be developed including responsibilities
for all health care providers.
3- There should be a national evidence-based fall prevention protocol to dictate to hospitals
what to perform as an effective fall risk assessment, fall prevention strategies, and fall
related data analysis.
4- There should be effective communication between health care providers to increase
patient safety.
5- The fall risk factors of patients need to be identified during admission, the treatment
process, and after a fall. Moreover, the patient’s care plan should address their risk
factors while they are staying in the hospital.
6- The health care system should provide oversight to ensure that patient safety policies and
activities are being carried out successfully.
The system requirements necessary to prevent the aforementioned hazards and enable safe
execution of roles and responsibilities are:
1- There should be fall prevention/management strategies reflecting the ETTO condition for
the acute care hospital nursing staff who is working under specific work place
circumstances.
2- The responsibilities of all health care providers related to the fall policies should be
outlined clearly.
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3- There should be an explicit fall risk assessment tool introduced to acute care hospitals as
well as a fall prevention strategy to identify the patients at risk of fall and to prevent falls.
Moreover, a fall related data analysis methodology is required to effectively identfiy the
contributing factors to patients’ falls.
4- Health care providers should be in contact with each other effectively to optimise the care
and safety for the patients.
5- There should be approaches for regular patient safety checks.
The main goal of identifying the system level hazards and constraints is to design effective
controls to enforce them, and to observe and improve an existing system that needs to satisfy the
requirements as much as possible. The directors of the hospital require knowledge about the
safety state of the whole system in order to improve the services over time for the future. A
summary of steps 2 and 3 are shown in Table 1.
Hazards

Safety Constraints

Patient supervision is not continuous.
1. Nurses are multitasking and
adopting with the work condition
circumstances.
2. Patients span 24 hours in a patient
day, nurses work in shifts of less
than 24 hours.
3. Patient needs are variable across
patients and across time
4. Monitoring of patient needs (e.g.,
call bell system) is not always
reliable.

The work place circumstances such as nurses
multi-tasking need to be considered to provide
the most efficient care/supervision for the
patients. The fall prevention strategies and best
practices must reflect the ETTO condition.

Implementation of falls prevention is not
perfect.
1. A specific falls prevention protocol
is not dictated for hospitals.
2. Best practices do not always exist
(lack of research clarity).
3. Adverse event reporting and

There should be a national evidence-based fall
prevention protocol to dictate to hospitals what
to perform as an effective fall risk assessment,
fall prevention protocol, and fall related data
analysis.

Policies for falls need to be developed
including responsibilities for all health care
providers.
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analysis of fall events not perfect.
4. Risk assessment tools are not
perfect.
Patients have many conditions that affect
balance and their risk of falls.
1. Some patients arrive being fall
prone as a secondary condition to
the primary reason for hospital
admission.
2. Surgery/treatment has after effects.
3. Many admission conditions directly
and severely impact balance and
strength (e.g., strokes).
4. Patients’ conditions are not
constant.

The fall risk factors of patients need to be
identified during admission, the treatment
process, and after a fall.

Patients do not always follow care instructions.
1. Bodily needs (urination) often preempt safety needs (Maslow’s
hierarch of needs)
2. Patients often have
cognitive/mental conditions that
interfere with logical
thinking/problem solving (e.g.,
ALCs often have dementia)
Table 1,
System Hazards and Safety Constraints

It is important to remember the fact that a
certain number of falls are inevitable in acute
care hospitals. The health care team need to
provide safety of patients in addition to prepare
them for a routine life.
The fall prevention strategy promotion has to
address the needs for the patients with various
health issues.

The next section describes the static model of what exists in place today as the health care
control structure in Ontario for patients’ fall prevention. The next step after describing the static
model is to conduct a gap analysis to identify what needs to be changed to assist in preventing
future patients’ falls in acute care hospitals.

Step 4: Static Model of the Hierarchical Fall Prevention Control Structure
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In this step, a static model of the fall prevention control structure is provided. Leveson et
al. (2012) distinguish between a static model and a dynamic model. “Static” simply refers to the
fact that the model is representative of the present structure of the system, whereas “dynamic”
refers to a computer representation that allows the effects of changes to the system to be tested.
Only the static version of this process is used here in this thesis. The health care safety control
structure related to fall prevention models the entire system in the form of a hierarchy in which
each higher level imposes constraints on the action(s) of the lower level beneath it. The
hierarchical system safety control structure for Ontario acute care hospital falls prevention is
provided in Figure 8. The objective of the control structure is to ensure that the health care
system’s goals are achieved. This control structure illuminates that patient fall prevention
strategies and constraints are enforced by a complex system. A focus on some parts of the
hospital hierarchical control structure was needed since the safety control structure was very
complex. In Figure 8, the black arrows show the imposed constraints to the lower level of the
control structure by the higher level component. The dotted black arrows and the returning
arrows to the upper level components represent feedback between the components of the health
care system (as understood from the information gathering process). An overview of the
system’s controllers’ roles, responsibilities, and interfaces related to patient falls prevention is
explained.
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Figure8:
The hierarchical control structure for the Ontario health care system regarding fall prevention
strategies.
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Hierarchical Control Structure Roles and Responsibilities:

In this section, different control loops and their connections are introduced to understand
the nature of the system. In addition, the upper level and lower level components and controllers’
responsibilities and their connections are presented to clarify their roles and controlled processes
in the hospital.

Control Loops and Interfaces:

It is important to distinguish the different control loops and their function in the
hierarchical control structure. Also, different control loops have specific control actions and
process models to control a process. The type of control action in a control loop is specified in
this research study and the control loop mechanisms are shown in ovals. As shown by different
colours of ovals in Figure 8, there are four major control loops across the system’s hierarchical
control structure called budgetary, educational, practice, and policy control loops.
Budgetary control loops: in this control loop, the upper level organization provides the budget
for the lower level organization’s actions. The budgetary control loops have a strong influence
on the whole system due to the financial support of the upper level’s organization. The lower
level organization is dependent on the budget provided by the higher level for its operation.
Budget is the main output of the upper level organization. This constraint makes the lower
level’s behaviour dependent on the upper level’s output. For example, each LHIN is dependent
on the budget provided by the MOHLTC to plan, integrate and fund health care services to meet
the local health needs and priorities. The purple ovals represent the budget control loops.
Educational control loops: in the educational control loops, the upper level controller imposes
the appropriate constraint to the lower level by providing them with educational information. For
example, fall prevention strategies and best practices are educational constraints which are
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provided by the collaboration of three different organizations (Safer Healthcare Now, RNAO,
and the LHIN. The fall prevention strategy is an educational evidence-based best practice
introduced to the acute care hospital. The fall prevention strategies and best practices increase
the awareness of the health care team, patients and families about falls. The red ovals show the
educational control loops.
Practice control loops: in the practice control loops, the upper level controller introduces the
proper practice as a constraint to the lower level’s behaviour. Usually, the practice control loop is
the result of an existing educational control loop. The fall prevention strategies and best practices
provided to the hospital’s vice president of professional practice and chief nursing executive
officer results in imposing the designated practices to the lower level controllers such as the
nurse educators and unit coordinators. This flow of information continues to other lower levels
within this hierarchy down to the registered nurse level where this information gets put into
practice. For instance, the registered nurses will be notified to apply a specific fall risk
assessment tool (for the present hospital it was the Morse Fall Scale) on every admission. For the
present hospital patients identified at risk of falling wear a wrist-band which indicates that the
patient is at risk of falling. In turn, this information assists the nurses with identifying the patients
at risk of falling and helping to prevent falls from occurring. The yellow ovals show the practice
control loops.
Policy control loops: in the policy control loops, the upper level organization imposes a
constraint on the behaviour of the lower level organization by introducing new policies and
standards. Thus, the main output of the upper level organization or function is policy. For
instance, in the present hospital there is a policy control loop between the risk management
department and each unit to report the adverse events by using the AEMS reporting system. The
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registered nurses are responsible to report patient falls with different levels of injury. The orange
oval between the risk management department and all hospital units in the static model
represents a policy control loop.

The Upper Level Controllers:

The Ontario government provides the budgetary source for the health care system.
MOHLTC receives its budget from the Ontario government. Ontario’s Local Health Integration
Networks (LHINs) were created by the MOHLTC in March 2006. The province of Ontario was
divided into 14 regions or LHINs (LHIN, 2013). The MOHLTC provides funding for the LHINs
and the Local Health System Integration Act, 2006 authorizes the LHINs to manage their local
health care system (MOHLTC, 2012). The purpose of the act is: “to provide for an integrated
health system to improve the health of Ontarians through better access to high quality health
services, co-ordinated health care in local health systems and across the province and effective
and efficient management of the health system at the local level by local health integration
networks” (Local Health System Integration Act, 2006). In Ontario, each LHIN must develop an
integrated health service plan for the local health system. The LHINs plan, integrate and fund
health care services enabling each service to meet their local community’s health needs and
priorities. Hospitals are one of the health care services funded by LHINs (LHIN, 2013).
According to the Local Health System Integration Act (2006), each LHIN must submit to the
Minister an annual report on its affairs and operations during its immediately preceding fiscal
year (Local Health System Integration Act, 2006). The LHINs are accountable to the Ministry
through the Ministry-LHIN Accountability Agreements (LHIN, 2011). Related to parts of the
Local Health System Integration Act (2006) these agreements lay out the funding and
performance obligations of both parties. The MOHLTC often funds provincial programs relevant
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to falls by the LHINs and or Health Service Providers. The budgetary control loops between
MOHLTC and LHIN; LHIN and the acute care hospital; and MOHLTC and organizations that
provide provincial programs relevant to falls are illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9,
The hierarchical control structure for the health care system regarding fall prevention
strategies. (Higher level components)

LHINs are aligned with some other provincial and national organizations and initiatives in
order to reduce falls and decrease the health care system burden resulting from falls.
Accreditation Canada and RNAO are two organizations that collaborate with LHINs.
In September 2010, fall prevention was identified as a top priority by the MOHLTC (LHIN,
2011). As a result, the Integrated Provincial Falls Prevention Project was started by LHINs in
October 2010. This project included a framework for fall prevention at the local and provincial
level to guarantee a consistent approach to prevent falls across the province. The project
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consisted of two phases. The existing successful fall prevention programs, fall assessment tools
and resources were identified during the first phase of the Integrated Provincial Falls Prevention
project. The main focus of the project’s second phase was on releasing this framework and
toolkit to health care services across the province as well as implementing some of the key
actions in the framework. As a result of this project, an evidence-based best practice guideline
introduced by RNAO and Safer Healthcare Now was introduced to the acute care hospital as a
fall prevention strategy (LHIN, 2011). The project was funded by the MOHLTC. The funding
process of the LHIN and health care providers, such as hospitals accountability indicators, is as
follows: MOHLTC and LHINs set a target for each health care accountability indicator such as
emergency room length of stay and wait time for cancer surgery. The funding process is based
on an achieved target. In order to receive the allocated fund for a health care accountability
indicator, a health care provider is required to perform at the LHIN’s accountability agreement
target or better. Presently falls are not part of the accountability indicator in the agreements
between the LHIN and the acute care hospital being studied. However, the benchmarking
process could exist in the future to allocate budget for fall prevention in acute care hospitals
within the present LHIN. In other words, the LHIN could add another accountability indicator
and define the hospital’s fall rate as an accountability indicator and set a target based on the
adverse event reporting systems’ data from different hospitals. Therefore, some part of the
budget transfer could be dependent upon whether the hospital is within the acceptable range of
fall rate (the target) as provided in annual hospital reports (feedback) to the LHIN. Obviously a
hospital budget is very complicated and the benchmarking process is only one small portion of
this. However, because accountability is an important aspect of the current health care system,
benchmarking and other budgetary controls are very common.
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The International Society for Quality in Healthcare (ISQua) is an independent organization
with 70 members from across the world (ISQua, 2012). ISQua evaluates and accredits health
care accreditors in different countries such as Accreditation Canada. “Accreditation Canada is a
not-for-profit, independent organization accredited by the ISQua. We provide national and
international health care organizations with an external peer review process to assess and
improve the services they provide to their patients and clients based on standards of excellence”
(Accreditation Canada, 2013). In Ontario, more than 400 organizations are accredited through
Accreditation Canada. Accreditation is a voluntary process for organizations to regularly and
consistently examine and improve the quality of their services. The accreditation program is free,
national, bilingual, and not-for-profit. Accreditation Canada staff assess health care
organizations every four years to determine whether health care organizations meet the Required
Organizational Practices (ROPs) identified in various patient safety areas such as falls prevention
(Accreditation Canada, 2012). Within the program of Accreditation Canada, an ROP is defined
as: “an essential practice that organizations must have in place to enhance patient/client safety
and minimize risk” (ROPs, 2012, p. 1). Accreditation Canada has identified having a falls
prevention strategy in place (specific details of the strategy are not identified explicitly) as an
ROP (see Appendix B for fall prevention strategy as a ROP). The goal of this ROP is to reduce
the risk of injuries resulting from falls. There are a number of compliance measures used, which
include:


The health care team (hospital) has implemented a fall prevention strategy.



The strategy identifies the population(s) at risk for falls.



The strategy addresses the specific needs of the population at risk for falls.
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The team evaluates the fall prevention strategy on an on-going basis to identify trends,
causes and degree of injury.



The team uses the evaluation information to make improvements to its fall prevention
strategy (ROPs, 2012, p. 54).

A number of surveyors from Accreditation Canada conduct on-site surveys in hospitals to study
if the ROPs are meeting the standards. They study patient-related documents, interview different
program staff, leaders, educators and patients to identify areas for improvement and a measure of
an organization’s services compared against standards of excellence. Accreditation is a
proactive process which aims to improve the services provided to the patients.
The LHIN would work with Accreditation Canada to identify the accredited organizations
and determine how they are meeting the ROPs. At the time of this study the acute care hospital
where the patient fell was accredited by Accreditation Canada (including its falls prevention
strategy) and is preparing for its next accreditation process.
The RNAO is a professional association representing Registered Nurses in Ontario. In
collaboration with Safer Healthcare Now, an evidence-based best practice guideline, “Prevention
of Falls and Injuries in the Older Adult” was developed through funding from the MOHLTC
(RNAO, 2005). The guideline’s main objectives were increasing all nurses’ confidence,
knowledge, skills and abilities in the identification of adults within health care settings at risk of
falling and to define interventions for the prevention of falling and reduction of injury. This
guideline, updated in 2012, is at the centre of many of the falls prevention strategies seen in
health care settings across the province such as the hospital where the patient discussed in this
thesis experienced his fall. The nursing and allied health professional practice department
receives the best practice guidelines under the supervision of the vice president of professional
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practice and the chief nursing executive officer in the hospital. The fall prevention best practices
are presented to all nurse educators as a designated practice to educate nursing staff about falls,
fall risks, and fall prevention strategies. The following strategies were implemented in the
present hospital as fall prevention interventions:


Fall risk assessment – utilizing the Morse Fall Scale completed on every admission,
transfer, weekly, after a fall or change in patient status or medications.



Communication of the risk – using yellow arm bands, falls risk signs at head of beds, and
provision of non-slip socks for the patients at risk of falling.



Patient/family education about the risk of falling.



Implementation of interventions suggested by higher level controllers (i.e. RNAO and
Safer Healthcare Now) for those at risk of falling. The following checklist is the standard
intervention implemented in the acute care hospital to reduce fall rates for the patients at
high risk of falling:
o

Providing a call bell within the patient’s reach.

o

Adjusting the patient’s bed to the appropriate height.

o

Providing non-slip and secure footwear.

o

Supplying mobility aids such as canes and walkers and putting them within
a patient’s reach.

o

Assessing the patient’s need for toileting.

o

Providing family and patient education about falls.

As discussed above, the patient safety specialists and risk management specialists receive the
Adverse Event Management System (AEMS) report when a fall happens in the hospital (A
detailed explanation about AEMS is provided in the following section). They analyze fall data
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based on the “Canadian Incident Analysis Framework” introduced by the Canadian Patient
Safety Institute (CPSI). The CPSI received funding support from Health Canada in order to
establish this framework (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012). This analysis method is
a holistic structured process used to analyze different types of patient safety incidents (with
harm/no harm included) and near misses. The incident analysis framework assists the specialists
to determine what happened, why that happened, what actions can be taken in reducing the risk
of the accident, what can be learned, and how the learning can be shared (Canadian Incident
Analysis Framework, 2012). The incident analysis is a part of the incident management
continuum (see appendix D for the incident management continuum). Three timelines are
discussed in the continuum including before the incident, immediate, and after the incident.
Before the incident, there is a need for a safety culture with leadership support at all levels of the
organization to ensure the safety of patients. Also, the learning generated from the previous
events promotes building of an improved safety culture within the organization. Support and
care for the patient/family members and providing the incident report to the risk management
department is required immediately after the incident. The incident analysis is the responsibility
of specialists after the accident which assists to better understand what happened and why. Two
methods introduced to analyze individual accidents in this framework are: comprehensive and
concise. The “comprehensive analysis method is usually used for complicated and complex
incidents that resulted in catastrophic/major harm, or the significant risk thereof. Multiple
sources of information are consulted, including interviews with those directly or indirectly
involved in the incident as well as experts, supplemented by a literature review…, The final
report produced includes a detailed chronology of the facts, contributing factors and their
influences, findings from the literature search/environmental scan, context analysis,
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recommended actions, and where applicable, implementation, evaluation and dissemination
plans. Concise analysis is a succinct, yet systematic way to analyze incidents with no, low or
moderate severity of harm. Generally the incident and analysis process is localized to the
unit/program where care was delivered. The sources of information consulted are the available
reports, supplemented with a small number of select interviews and a targeted review of other
sources of information. The analysis is completed in a short interval of time by one or two
individuals. At the end of the analysis, a report is produced that contains the facts (including a
brief timeline), contributing factors, a brief context analysis, and where applicable,
recommended actions and a plan for evaluation and dissemination.” (Canadian Incident Analysis
Framework, 2012; p. 36).
MOHLTC, LHINs, Accreditation Canada, RNAO, Safer Healthcare Now, and Canadian
Patient Safety Institute are the main upper level controllers in Ontario’s health care system to
control fall prevention strategies above the hospital settings. LHINs provide the budget for health
care providers and collaborative organizations through MOHLTC and Ontario’s government.
Accreditation Canada is an organization to accredit the health care providers that meet the
standards of excellence and ROP requirements. Every hospital is required to implement a fall
prevention strategy to satisfy the accreditation process by Accreditation Canada. The specifics of
these strategies are not dictated by a higher level organization to the hospitals. Thus, each
hospital meets its accreditation needs in unique ways (the fall prevention strategy implemented
in this acute care hospital was explained above). The hospital’s fall prevention strategy was
derived from an evidence-based best practice guideline, “Prevention of Falls and Injuries in the
Older Adult” which was developed in collaboration with the RNAO and Safer Healthcare Now.
In addition to the upper level controllers, the lower level controllers play an important role in
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patients’ fall prevention in an acute hospital. The roles and connections between the lower level
controllers will be described in the following section.

The Lower Level Controllers:

The risk management specialist designs and maintains the Adverse Event Management
System (AEMS) which is a web-based adverse-event reporting system. The fall related data
captured is analyzed and reported to a patient safety specialist. Also, the risk management
specialist has the responsibility to identify the possible risk factors of falls by analyzing the
adverse event reports and suggesting strategies to minimize falls in collaboration with other
departments.
The patient safety specialist has the responsibility of monitoring the fall data through
AEMS and utilizing the data to educate and improve patient safety, ensuring that the
implementation of the fall prevention strategies in all units of the hospital are effective,
evaluating fall risk assessment tools to see if the tool is valid and reliable, and analyzing falls in
collaboration with the risk management department.
Nurse educators have a pivotal role in teaching staff about falls, falls’ risk to patients, fall
prevention strategies and interventions, and process/actions to be taken if someone falls. In
addition, nurse educators have the responsibility to audit staff compliance of education related to
assessing risks related to falls and implementing appropriate strategies to reduce falls.
Every acute care hospital consists of different units and there are health care team members
assigned for different responsibilities in different units. Therefore, each unit has its own director,
manager and coordinator. The unit coordinator is in direct contact with patients, registered
nurses, allied health care providers and physicians to discuss the best possible arrangement of
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care for the patients in a specific unit. The unit coordinator enables the nursing staff to focus
more on the medical needs of the patient, which in turn results in a higher quality of care and
better safety. The unit coordinator is in contact with the patient safety specialist and nurse
educator and together, they discuss the best practices for fall prevention in the unit.
Physicians are one of the primary health care individuals responsible for the care of
patients including identifying any risk factors for falls after a fall and adhering to a care plan
which reduces the risks. Examples include: reviewing the patient's medications and adjusting
them, eliminating the need for intravenous medications if possible, and consulting with a
physiotherapist, occupational therapist and/or dietician as necessary, etc.
Registered Nurses are responsible for the care of patients, including assessing for falls risk
and follow up with interventions, communication to the health care team about patient risks, and
managing the care of the patient after a fall. The specific care after a fall includes: assessment,
documentation, and follow up with appropriate care depending on the seriousness of the fall as
well as maintaining and/or increasing relevant interventions for fall risk such as a closer eye on
the patient, use bed alarms, etc.
Figure 10 presents the picture for the lower levels of the health care hierarchical control
structure (the acute care hospital). Different control loops in the lower levels of the hierarchy will
be explained in detail along with a separate picture in order to optimize clarification.
If and when a patient falls the nurse, who is assigned to the patient, completes the AEMS
report after the patient’s fall. The AEMS is a web-based tool to assist the organization to
identify, document and investigate any unexpected and undesirable events or near misses related
to patients, the hospital, and patient property. It was implemented in the present hospital in
January 2009 for the first time and there were 494 events logged into the system a month later,
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365 of which were actual events and 129 that were near misses. The top three event-types during
a month in the hospital were: 1) medication related, 2) falls, and 3) laboratory test related (The
AEMS report, 2009). The AEMS report includes the details about the event and identifies
contributing factors to the event. The following information is provided in an AEMS report
related to any type of adverse event.


The date and time of the adverse event.



The unit/department in which the event occurred.



The event type. There are different types of adverse events which may occur in
acute care hospitals such as food/nutrition, fall, and infection related adverse
events. In addition, the type of fall is specified in the AEMS report. A fall from
bed, chair, toilet, wheelchair, in tub/shower, and while walking/standing are
different types of falls defined in the AEMS reporting system in the acute care
hospital.



The event severity (see below).



The people involved in the event. In fall related events, it is required to clarify if the
event was witnessed or not. According to the information from the literature, most
in-patient falls are un-witnessed by staff members (Healey, Scobie, Glampson,
Pryce, Joule & Willmott, 2007).



The details related to the adverse event. A narrative description of the event which
briefly states the facts describing what happened, and potential contributing factors,
is provided in the AEMS report.



The immediate actions taken after the event.
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The nurse in charge of the patient is responsible to complete the adverse event report,
provide the information related to the patient’s fall, and submit the AEMS report online when a
fall happens. The submitted events create notifications based on the severity of harm to the most
responsible leader for review. Different levels of harm introduced in the AEMS web-based tool
are as follows:
Level 1: No harm/ injury, no assessment required
Level 2: No harm/injury, assessment/monitoring required
Level 3: Temporary harm
Level 4: Permanent harm
Level 5: Death
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Figure 10,
The hierarchical control structure for health care system regarding fall prevention strategies.
(Lower level components)
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For example, in the present study the patient’s fall injury level was identified as a three
since some bruises were found on his body. For level three of harm, the unit coordinator and
physician are the most responsible caregivers who receive the notification. In any event that
involves higher levels of harm (higher than three), the unit coordinator, physician, chief resident,
medical chief, risk management department, quality and safety department, and Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) receive notification of the AEMS report. Also, the Ministry of Labour receives
notification about a fall labelled as a level five (falls resulting in death). Thus, depending on the
severity of the fall, notifications go to different levels of the hierarchical control structure. The
more severe fall notifications go to higher levels. This is considered as feedback to the health
care team about the fall occurrence. Figure 11 illustrates the AEMS reports notifications related
to patients’ falls to different levels of the acute care hospital.

Figure 11,
AEMS report notifications related to falls (feedback). LEFT: notifications for the fall injury level
of three. RIGHT: notifications for the fall injury level of four or/and five.
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The patient safety specialist in the Quality and Safety department and risk management
specialist in the Risk Management department receive the AEMS reports for falls resulting in
level four or five/death. These departments do not receive the AEMS reports for the lower levels
of falls unless they request them (which they do for annual reports – see below). Patient safety
and risk management specialists analyze the data separately (AEMS reports) based on the
“Incident Analysis Framework” introduced by Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI). The
Incident Analysis Framework is a qualitative analysis method to analyze the incidents that cause
harm to patients. However, this framework is not specifically designed to analyze falls or near
falls. After analysing the data, patient safety and risk management specialists provide some input
and feedback into the system as a result of incident analysis. The inputs are considered as
constraints to lower level behaviour. For example, patient safety and risk management specialists
could consider the lack of supervision as a patient’s fall risk factor. Then, they might make the
suggestion to assign more nurses for the patients having the same condition. The patient safety
and risk management specialists will pass their suggestions to their director. The next level for
the suggestions is the vice president of professional practice and chief nursing executive officer.
The change will be introduced as a practice if the suggestions are accepted. This is a practice
control loop. Unit coordinators and nurse educators obtain the designated practice information
and inform the registered nurses. Figure 12 represents this practice control loop in the hospital.
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Figure 12,
The practice control loop related to AEMS analysis in the hospital.

As part of their annual evaluation process, the unit coordinators may have the number of
falls in their unit as a performance indicator. These performance indicators may also have
implications for annual salary increments. The unit manager and unit coordinator meet to
evaluate the coordinator’s performance. The performance evaluation process is assumed to have
an influence on the entire unit’s (including the nurses and PSWs) behaviour to reduce adverse
events in the unit (Figure 13). Obviously annual evaluations for any employee may involve
information about falls, however, falls are not tagged as a formalized part of the review process.
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For example, a nurse educator could be evaluated for his/her performance regarding fall
prevention strategy delivery to the registered nurses. If the LHIN was to identify falls as part of
the benchmarking process, it would be more likely that falls would appear in annual evaluations
of particular hospital employees, like unit coordinators.

Figure 13,
The evaluation process in the hospital.

The unit director (who reports to the vice president of professional practice and chief
nursing executive officer directly) receives the analyzed adverse events’ data/information from
the risk management specialist every year in order to identify the most common adverse events
and their characteristics in the unit. The unit director will ask the unit manager to investigate the
problem areas and provide a written plan/report to reduce such occurrences. The unit manager
will request the unit coordinator and nurse educator to deliver a solution as a plan/report as soon
as possible. The unit coordinator and nurse educator investigate the problem in their unit and
provide the report/plan based on the practice and educational constraint received from upper
level components (clinical education, and nursing and allied health professional practice
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department). The unit director will report (feedback) the result of a unit’s achievements
regarding adverse event prevention strategies to the Vice President, Professional Practice and
Chief Nursing Executive officer. Ultimately the hospital Board of Directors will receive the
feedback from the Vice President (Figure 14).

Figure 14,
The practice control loop in identification of the most common adverse event in a unit and its
preventive strategies.
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Understanding the process of identifying patients at risk of falling before a fall happens in
the hospital will help to clarify the hospital’s fall prevention program. The registered nurse and
physician are two members of the health care team who assess the patient’s fall risk factors. At
this hospital the Morse Fall Scale is applied during the admission process to evaluate a patient’s
risk of falling. Wearing a yellow arm bracelet and having a “fall” sign beside the patient’s bed
are strategies used to identify patients at risk. Patients with a high risk of falling and their
families receive a pamphlet as well as verbal instructions and education about falls and risk
factors for falls in a hospital setting.
The fall risk identification process, communication of the risk, and prevention strategies
stem from the educational control loop provided by higher levels of the hierarchy such as RNAO
and Safer Healthcare Now. This educational information functions as a constraint on lower level
components assisting nurses and patients to behave safely. The information flows downward to
the vice president of professional practice, nursing resource unit/clinical education department,
nursing and allied health professional practice department, Quality and Safety department, and
Risk Management department in the hospital. Every nurse educator in a specific hospital unit
receives the fall prevention strategies and best practices through his/her clinical education update
in the hospital. The registered nurses obtain the designated practices for patients’ fall prevention
through the nurse educator. Figure 15 represents the connection between both the educational
and practice control loops regarding patient’s fall risk assessments in the hospital.
Many personnel play a role in the fall prevention efforts of a hospital (lower level of the
system). Different control loops between these components (personnel) show the interaction and
feedback between them. The registered nurses have the responsibility of filling out the AEMS
reports when a fall occurs. The patient safety and risk management specialists analyze the
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reported falls based on the incident analysis framework and introduce the required changes as a
practice. The unit coordinator and nurse educator receive the designated practices and introduce
them to the registered nurse in order to prevent falls and reduce the failures.

Figure 15,
The educational and practice control loops regarding patient’s fall risk assessment in the
hospital.
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Step 5: Gap Analysis
In the gap analysis, the controllers and their control actions which were explained in the
static model above will be examined to identify potentially problematic areas. The controllers
were analyzed to determine whether the context they work in allows them to properly satisfy
their safety responsibilities and whether they have the resources and information they need to
enforce the safety constraints they have been assigned. Furthermore, the overall communication
and coordination between system controllers was studied as well as the general system safety
culture related to patient fall prevention.
According to the aforementioned information, the fall related AEMS reports are under the
jurisdiction of the nurse in charge of the patient’s care in the acute care hospital. Figure 16
represents the policy control loop related to the AEMS report. The upper level’s (risk
management department) constraint on nurses’ behaviour is the policy of filling out the AEMS
reports in case of a patient fall. The Risk Management and Quality and Safety department
requires understanding the environment and context in which the nurses play their role in patient
care. Therefore, both departments need to ensure that the context the nurses’ work in allows
them to properly satisfy their safety responsibilities.The fall related AEMS reports in the hospital
contain limited information about the fall and the contributing factors of falls because they are
filled out by the nurses who have to multi-task during their shift. The context in which the nurses
play their role requires them to multi-task in a challenging environment. The nurses often do not
have enough time to report a fall during their shift. It was learned that many AEMS reports are
completed after a nurse finishes her shift. Memory for details may be poor and the nurses may be
motivated to keep the reports brief if they are doing this work on their own time. In addition to
filling out the AEMS reports, there are other issues as well.
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Figure 16,
The policy control loop related to AEMS reports by the nurses.

Using the AEMS data the patient safety specialist in the acute care hospital (where the fall
occurred) found it difficult to introduce productive/functional policy changes or instructions to
reduce fall rates in the stroke unit. In addition to the fact that the reports lack detail, as mentioned
above, there are other problems with adverse event reporting as highlighted by the specialist as
well as in the research literature. Firstly, the information in the AEMS report is not sufficient to
fully understand the contributing factors to falls. To understand the contributing factors of falls
requires sufficient information. The data from an acute care hospital will not be enough
data/information to provide the statistical power to look for contributing factors. The National
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was created to address this problem in Britain (Shaw et al.,
2005). They have produced an IT-based system to which many hospitals contribute their adverse
event data. Different hospitals submitted their adverse event reports into the central registry
system to collect higher powered data in order to improve safety within Britain’s health care
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system. According to the results of a study by Shaw et al. (2005) this national IT-based reporting
system enables the health care system to collect more powerful data (30,000 incidents from 18
health care delivery organizations in Britain within a 10 month period) on incidents. This
centralizing strategy does not exist in Ontario meaning that each hospital will have only a limited
data source with which to work. In Ontario, a provincial/central adverse event reporting system
could improve this analysis process. Obviously the MOHLTC could be the organization to
provide the budget and resources for this process.

Communication and Coordination:

Communication and coordination between the system’s controllers play an important role
to identify sources of unsafe behaviour (Leveson, 2011). In this step of the CAST analysis,
overall communications and coordination (specifically in the higher levels of the health care
system) are examined to identify instances where coordination and communication between
controllers may have contributed to patient falls.
The complexity of Ontario’s health care system regarding fall prevention strategies and
policies may be problematic. There are many controllers affecting fall prevention strategies in
Ontario’s health care system. This, potentially, needless complexity and redundancy increases
the interaction and dependency between different controllers in the hierarchical control structure.
For example, the hospital receives information about fall prevention best practices from RNAO,
Safer Healthcare Now and the LHIN. According to Leveson (2011), when multiple
organizations/controllers control the same process, coordination risks arise. As a result, two
unsafe interactions may occur due to coordination risks:
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1- Both controllers assume that the appropriate control actions are being performed by the
other controller, and as a result, neither controller takes action. Or,
2- Conflicting control actions are provided that have unintended consequences.
The coordination risks cause the migration towards unsafe zones in the long-term. To
avoid the coordination risk there should be a consistent supervision and flow of feedback
between the controllers about the controlled process.
According to the information received from the acute care hospital, the patient safety
specialists analyze the AEMS reports data independently from the risk management specialists.
There is a lack of communication between the patient safety and risk management specialists
even though they are in the same overall department. This lack of communication can cause
either duplication of work or absence of the proper action. Moreover, it was learned that the
patient safety specialists utilize sources of information about falls other than the AEMS reports
(such as call-bell reports in a specific unit that a fall happened, and staffing records) because they
believe that the AEMS report is not sufficient to uncover reasons for falls. The patient safety
specialist interviewed believed that the AEMS reports are not always completed precisely. The
patient safety specialist also believed that there should be educational sessions for the nurses in
order to know about specific fall cases in a unit. Although the patient safety specialist shares her
findings with the unit coordinator and upper level controllers (in the case of suggesting a new
practice), she thought it would be more helpful for the nurses to know about each fall case and
the specialists’ idea/ analysis about the contributing factors to falls in their unit.
The other communication problem identified in the control structure is related to the risk
assessment process. Different health care provider organizations (i.e. hospital, long-term care
etc.) use different fall risk assessment tools to identify patients at risk of falling. The Morse fall
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scale is used in this particular acute care hospital. The Morse fall scale is a valid and reliable tool
in acute care setting (Morse, Morse, & Tylko, 1989; Scott et al., 2007), but not all risk
assessment tools are valid and reliable. Although this hospital applies the Morse risk assessment
tool, health care settings have the freedom to choose a fall risk assessment tool and apply it in
their setting. There is a need for vertical communication between the upper level controllers to
provide directions about a suitable fall risk assessment tool to the health care organizations. Scott
et al. (2007) found that many institutions in Ontario were using non validated tools.

Dynamics and Feedback:

According to Leveson (2011), most major accidents occur due to the migration of the
system towards reduced safety margins over time. In this particular patient’s fall case, Ontario’s
health care control structure related to patient falls prevention showed some weaknesses by the
presence of multiple controllers and a lack of feedback. In some cases, the control over the fall
prevention strategy’s introduction was handled by three different organizations. At the same
time, the lack of inspections and surveillance programs performed by the organizations reduced
the feedback to the upper levels of the control structure regarding the state of the system. The
lack of feedback combined with the process being used by different controllers over time can
cause the migration of a system towards an unsafe condition. Feedback is required for any
complex system because there is a lack of direct information for the controllers about the process
(Leveson, 2011; Hollnagel, 2004). Incorrect and/or no feedback can lead to accidents. According
to Leveson (2011), two basic types of feedback are needed to keep a complex system with
human controllers in a safe state. First, there must be feedback about the state of the controlled
process. This will help to understand the controllers’ process models and identify failures in
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other parts of the control loop. Second, there must be feedback about the result of controllers’
actions. This feedback makes the human errors observable and therefore preventable. In addition,
according to a research study conducted by Fixsen, Scott, Blase, Naoom and Wagar (2011),
introducing an evidence-based fall prevention program to an organization without evidencebased implementation methods is problematic. In other words, the upper level controllers are
unable to realize whether the fall prevention strategies are implemented accurately in the acute
care hospital, unless there is effective implementation. The authors argue that in addition to
understanding of WHAT (prevention strategies) needs to be done in order to reduce patients’
falls, there is a need for recognising HOW (implementation strategies) to ensure the effective use
of the fall preventions in practice. Fixsen et al. (2011) concluded that: “Implementation,
organization change, and system change methods produce the conditions that allow and support
the full and effective use of evidence-based intervention.”(p.419). Although fall prevention
strategies and best practices are provided to the hospital by RNAO, LHIN and Safer Healthcare
Now, there is a lack of feedback channels from the hospital itself to the responsible
organizations. At the same time, the lack of oversight and inspection to monitor the performance
of the hospital and its controllers at different levels by three different organizations exists. A
more effective strategy would be to require hospitals to provide feedback about the fall
prevention strategies and best practices implementation process in the hospital to the RNAO,
LHIN and Safer Healthcare Now organizations. Also, these organizations need to know if the
strategies are appropriate in terms of reducing fall occurrences. Reporting the number of falls
and the contributing factors of falls (provided in AEMS reports) will increase the awareness of
the three organizations about the need of patients and the gaps in the hospital’s health care team.
Also, providing implementation methods for the introduced fall prevention strategies and best
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practices will assist the upper level organizations to assure the effective uses of the strategies in
practice.
This lack of feedback and supervision exists between the Canadian Patient Safety Institute
and the hospital. CPSI has no plan in place to monitor the performance of the hospital’s patient
safety specialists and risk management specialists. CPSI provides the educational information
regarding accident analysis techniques and does not evaluate how the technique is performing
within the hospital. The appropriate feedback in regards to the application of the incident
analysis framework in fall-related incidents by the hospital will also assist with better
comprehension of the patients’ demands because the Incident Analysis Framework is used to
analyze all adverse events in the hospital such as medication related incidents. Figure 17
illustrates the missing feedback loops in the health care hierarchical control structure. The red
dotted arrows display the missing feedback in the system.
As indicated above, the lack of functional policy constraint from the patient safety and risk
management department to the stroke unit’s health care team can be related to the lack of
feedback to RNAO, Safer Healthcare Now and CPSI about the fall prevention strategies and
Incident Analysis Framework. The feedback from the acute care hospital’s responsible
departments will help to fill in the gaps in this framework and to develop strategies to decrease
the fall rates in the hospital.
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Figure 17,
The missing feedbacks in health care control structure in patients’ fall prevention.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
The primary reason for injury admissions to Canada’s acute care hospitals is falls,
accounting for 54.4% of all injury hospitalizations in acute care hospitals (CIHI, 2000). In 2012,
Montreal hospitals publicly reported medical accidents which “contributed to or resulted in” the
deaths of at least 10 patients over the previous year and caused permanent disabilities in 16
patients (Derfel, 2012). These medical accidents included: a medication overdose, a patient fall
in the hospital, and an undetected malfunction of critical equipment among the causes of deaths.
According to the National Patient Safety Agency (2007), accidental falls have been identified as
the most commonly reported patient safety incident in hospitals. Identifying the systemic
contributing factors of falling and implementing fall prevention programs in hospitals can
prevent falls in the hospital setting, shorten the length of time patients spend in the hospital, and
improve the hospital mortality rate due to falls.
The complexity of the health care system that provided fall prevention strategies for the
acute care hospital was identified as a likely systemic problem. Complexity is difficult to handle.
The increasing complexity has unavoidable consequences, i.e., that the interaction and
dependency between different controllers increases (Holnagel, 2004). The complexity of the
system may prevent the flow of information from properly getting to the next level on-time.
According to Leveson (2011), a complex system causes some difficulty for the controllers to
operate safely. Therefore, increasing complexity of the system is one cause of degradation in
safety over time. Assigning fewer controllers/organizations to ensure fall prevention is suggested
to address the complexity of the system.
The upper level components in the health care system do not provide consistent and
explicit instructions about the most appropriate fall risk assessment tool, fall prevention
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strategy, and fall data analysis technique to the lower level components. There appears to be too
much freedom for health care providers to decide on how to prevent falls in their organizations,
which will cause inconsistency and subjectivity to be factors affecting care in hospitals. For
instance, only two valid and reliable fall risk assessment tools have been identified in the acute
care setting, yet different hospitals use markedly different fall risk assessment tools to identify
patients at risk of falling (Hempel, Newberry, Wang, Booth, Shanman, Johnsen ... & Ganz,
2013). Furthermore, this freedom can cause confusion and lack of evidence-based knowledge in
taking the appropriate action in patient fall prevention. Upper level components of the health
care system need to impose appropriate and clear constraints on each lower level components’
behaviour by providing them the information about the most appropriate/evidence-based fall
risk assessment tool, fall prevention strategy, and fall data analysis technique. One of the
requirements to introduce valid and reliable techniques to reduce falls in hospitals is to
understand falls in hospitals. This requires capturing rich and accurate data about patients’ falls
in acute care hospitals. Promoting a provincial adverse event reporting system and data registry
for acute care hospitals is suggested as a result of this thesis. A provincial adverse event
reporting system will help to capture reliable data due to the greater number of reported events
in one data-base, analyze the data accurately, and having the power to identify contributing
factors for falls and trends across acute care hospitals. According to the result of a study
performed in the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales, creating a national
incident reporting system to collect data on adverse events supplied data on patient safety and
health care delivery issues. The study collected data on various adverse events in different
health care settings (95% of the data was from acute care settings) which helped to better
understand problems in health care organizations (Shaw, Dever, Hughes, Osborn &Williams,
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2005). It has been proven that data obtained solely through adverse event reporting systems are
not sufficient to initiate quality improvements in patient care due to
underestimation/underreporting of the falls (Hill et al., 2010; Shorr et al., 2008). In addition to
the national adverse event reporting system, each hospital can still perform its own local
accident investigation and provide feedback to the upper level components to better target their
fall prevention interventions (Oliver, 2007). If an adverse event reporting system is to be used in
hospitals it is necessary for staff to receive proper training and adequate time to complete such
work. Congregating inaccurate or imprecise data is not helpful.
Fall risk assessment may not be the best strategy to start fall prevention in acute care
hospitals. Although it helps to realize whether the patient is at high or low risk of falling (then
apply a yellow arm band on their wrist for communication of the risk), fall risk assessment tools
do not always categorize people correctly as high or low risk. Oliver (2006) argued that a risk
assessment tool is different from a risk factor checklist which encourages health care team
members (e.g. nurses) to assess the patients’ fall risk factors and then try to address them. He
claimed that: “the risk factors that cause falls are not necessarily synonymous with those that
predict them – nor with those that can be reversed or modified to prevent them” (Oliver, 2006,
p.91). It has been suggested that paying attention to the reversible risk factors (confusion,
mobility and/or visual impairment, medication, and urinary incontinence) is a better prevention
strategy. Thus, it is better to identify all patients’ risk factors and then address the risk factors by
using a patient-centered intervention. According to the result of a study by Healy, Monro,
Cockram, Adams and Heseltine (2004), there was an association between a targeted risk factor
intervention plan and relative risk of falls reduction in a hospital. Eight units of a hospital were
allocated in the study. Pairs of these units were randomly assigned to control or intervention
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groups. Nursing staff on intervention units were asked to screen the fall risk factors (medical,
environmental, and physical) for the patients admitted with a history of falls. The health care
team was asked to address patients’ fall risk factors with the targeted intervention plan. Healy et
al. (2004) focused on targeted risk factor reduction instead of categorizing patients into risk
categories and found a positive association between the intervention plan and the relative risk of
recorded falls. Therefore it was suggested to identify a patient’s fall risk factors on their
admission and design a targeted intervention plan to reduce these risks.
The ineffectiveness of the AEMS reporting system is problematic. The observational data
achieved from the AEMS reporting system in the acute care hospital as well as the patient safety
specialist’s comments highlighted some important points. The AEMS reports related to patient
falls lack necessary details and filling out the reports is voluntary. This finding is in line with
other studies which claim clinical staff under-report the adverse events due to time constraints,
lack of focus on events, and fear of censure (Shaw et al., 2005; Hill et al., 2010). Shojania (2008)
argued that to promote a well-designed incident reporting system, the system needs to be easy to
use. He suggested that the incident reporting system should only capture the type and severity of
the incidents which lies in triaging for further investigation. This strategy would make the
incident reporting system easy to use since these systems are often perceived as a source of
frustration for the clinical staff (Shojania, 2008). The trained personnel in risk management and
accident investigation should take the responsibility to further investigate adverse events of
interest, not the nurses reporting the incidents (Shojania, 2008; Thomas & Peterson, 2003). The
patient safety and risk management specialists are not able to effectively analyze the data from
the adverse event reporting system in the hospital. They receive the reports but they are unable to
benefit from this information because either the data provided is not appropriate and/or sufficient
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or the analysis tool is not designed to analyze such data. As suggested above, a provincial
adverse event reporting system will help to capture different types of adverse events in health
care provider organizations and collect sufficient data for further incident analysis. In addition, a
dictated fall incidents analysis methodology/tool by the higher levels of the control structure
would assist the specialists to analyze the data more accurately.
It is important to learn from errors. Adverse event reporting and analysis systems were
devised as an essential component to improve safety by learning from errors (Wu, Pronovost &
Morlock, 2002). The AEMS system being used at the present hospital does not seem to provide
information useful to a learning process. Reason (1997) introduced four components of a safety
culture within an organization: reporting culture, just culture, flexible culture, and learning
culture to limit the organizational accidents. Each of these components’ existence makes the
organization a safer place with fewer accidents. He suggested that a good safety culture must be
based on learning. He stated that: “…, an organization must possess a learning culture – the
willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information system,
and the will to implement major reforms when their need is indicated.” (Reason, 1997; p. 196).
In addition, according to the technology acceptance model, a person starts using a technology
when the introduced technology is perceived useful and easy to use (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000).
The clinical staff reporting patient falls need to understand the usefulness of reporting the falls
by using the AEMS in the hospital. In this way, they can realize how their report can transform
to information which assists them to reduce falls. Therefore, there is a need to learn from the data
reported so that staff will continue this voluntary task. The patient safety specialist’s shares the
findings (from analyzing the AEMS reports information) with the unit coordinator. The patient
safety and risk management specialists would also share their findings with the nursing
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professional practice department, if they are making suggestions for changes in practice.
According to the patient safety specialist, it would help to prevent more falls if the cases and the
lessons learned can be shared with all of the units. The lack of opportunity to share this
information diminishes the awareness and knowledge translation about falls in the hospital.
Another reason that affected safety in this system is lack of supervision and feedback
between some controllers in the system. The educational information provided by the system’s
controllers (CPSI, LHIN, RNAO, and Safer Healthcare Now) is not sufficient to keep the system
in a safe state when planning for the long-term. This leaves the control loops incomplete. There
should be sufficient and appropriate feedback from the hospital to the upper level organizations
to complete the control loops.
Using CAST to identify the control structures for patients’ falls prevention in an acute care
hospital presented several challenges. Since CAST is derived from systems engineering, the
language and terminology can pose difficulties for a practitioner with limited background in
engineering. This language set is designed for engineers and it requires mastery of the language
as a first step (which is a time consuming process) before CAST can be applied effectively.
Another challenge when applying the CAST analysis is the data collection process. At times,
communicating to the upper level controllers and obtaining the needed information is not
possible since the responsible people are not either willing to respond to the questions or do not
have time to do so. Moreover, in contrast to the extensive information available to the public for
a disaster such as the Walkerton Water incident, there is very limited public information
available about non major accidents such as falls in hospitals. Having connections to insiders at
various levels of the system would be very advantageous, however they are very difficult, if not
impossible to make. A limitation of this thesis is the fact that the amount of information obtained
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was not optimal and there is almost certainly gaps between the control structures as described
and the structure that exists. Another challenge when using CAST is deciding how to represent
the control system in diagram form. A complex system such as the health care system means that
diagrams used to describe it are also very difficult to create and often difficult to understand.
Notwithstanding these challenges however, a CAST analsysis provides an effective way to
understand system safety and potentially make recommendations for its improvement.

Conclusion
The purpose of this research study was to conduct a qualitative accident analysis technique
(CAST) to better understand the health care system’s deficits in providing fall prevention
strategies in acute care hospitals. This thesis examined the entire health care system to
understand different organizations’ responsibilities and roles.
As the result of CAST analysis, the complexity of the health care system, lack of a
consistent and clear fall prevention strategy, risk assessment tool and fall data analysis
methodology, and effective communication between the controllers were identified as potentially
problematic. In addition, lack of feedback and supervision was found as another systemic area of
concern.
The results of this thesis lead to the following recommendations for both upper level
controllers and the hospital: the needless complexity in the system should be removed to ensure
effective communication (including supervision and feedback) between the controllers. A
provincial adverse event reporting system would improve the health care system’s ability to
capture more comprehensive data related to patient falls. Analyzing more robust data should
promote the identification of deficits in health care organization and the development of
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operational fall prevention strategies which addresses those deficits. The upper level controllers
are responsible for introduction of fall prevention and implementation strategies, fall risk
assessment tools, and fall analysis methods to the health care providers. An explicit, evidencebased, and unambiguous provision of these strategies would decrease the seemingly unnecessary
freedom and confusion by health care providers to select and implement appropriate strategies.
In the acute care hospital setting, it is recommended to identify patients’ fall risk factors
instead of categorizing them in groups of high and low risk of falling. A targeted fall prevention
plan should be performed to address the risk factors for patients who have these fall risk factors.
A learning culture enhances using lessons from previous adverse events. Providing the
opportunity for the sharing of fall data and analysis results with hospital nurses in regular
meetings is a recommended strategy to improve learning from previous falls. The regular
learning meetings in the hospital will also deliver feedback to the nurses about their contribution
to the adverse events reporting process.
It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will help to improve the patient safety and quality
of care in acute care hospitals in Ontario.
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Appendix A: SFIM Accident Causation Analysis
Following the patient’s fall, on May 15, 2012 the SFIM team investigated the accident and
completer the causal analysis of the fall in accordance with the stroke unit’s staff in an acute care
hospital. This section of this thesis summarizes the findings of the SFIM accident analysis report.

SFIM findings

The SFIM requires the investigative team to analyze the accident in accordance with the
four main layers of failures/conditions. The accident report found seven main “causal
factors/action/events” that led to the patient’s fall. Each event/unsafe act had related “preconditions” and “supervisory/organizational issues” that contributed to the fall. Based on
Reason’s Swiss Cheese model of accident (Reason, 2000), the following are the causal and
contributing factors of the patient’s fall in an acute care hospital. The causal factors are
categorized as unsafe acts (the first layer of the Swiss Cheese Model closest to the fall). The
related contributing factors in other layers of the Swiss Cheese Model are introduces as follow:
Causal and Contributing Factors:
 Causal Factor #1: After his stroke, the patient experienced falls 2-3 times a week during
2008 to 2010 (He self-diagnosed his first stroke and ignored any medical treatment in
2008).
Related Contributing Factors:


The patient’s isolation- the patient was living alone without any friend or family
members other than his landlord. (Precondition)



Not having a family doctor (Organization)
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Lack of consistent medical follow up (Supervision)

 Causal Factor #2: The patient started to use a walker inconsistently in 2010 as he was
becoming increasingly weak due to significant muscle wasting.
Related Contributing Factors:


Significant muscle wasting (Precondition)



General weakness (Precondition)



Malnourishment- The patient had an unhealthy diet. His poor diet consisted
mainly of chocolate bars and cigarettes. (Precondition)



Lack of assistance in grocery purchase and meal preparation (Supervision)

 Causal Factor #3: The patient experienced three falls in one day, the day before his
admission to the acute care hospital (13 May, 2012). He was unable to pick himself up
after his third fall.
Related Contributing Factor:


Patient’s frailty (Precondition)

 Causal Factor #4: The patient laid on the floor for seven hours after his fall (13 May,
2012).
Related Contributing Factors:


Lack of formal support network (Organization)



Lack of informal support network (Supervision)
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 Causal Factor #5: The patient’s recovery process was slow (14-17 May, 2012).
Related Contributing Factors:


Lack of patient’s motivation to participate in activities of daily living
(Precondition)



Patient’s depression (Precondition)

 Causal Factor #6: The patient decided to leave washroom without assistance (17 May, the
day of the fall).
Related Contributing Factors:


Patient’s confusion (Precondition)



Patient’s impulsiveness (Precondition)



Patient’s lack of motor skills due to stroke (Precondition)



Patient’s need of one assistance for all his transfers (Supervision)



Inappropriate use of words by the patient which makes him difficult to deal with.
(Precondition)

 Causal Factor #7: The patient’s right foot hit the walker (17 May, 2012).
Related Contributing Factor:


The patient’s unfamiliarity with the walker which was given to him in the hospital
(Precondition)

 Causal Factor #8: The patient tripped over his walker (17 May, 2012).
Related Contributing Factor:
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Patient’s lack of limb movement control (Precondition)

 Causal Factor #9: The patient lost his balance (17 May, 2012).
Related Contributing Factors:


The patient’s general muscle weakness (Precondition)



The patient’s lack of coordination (Precondition)



The patient’s legs often gave out (Precondition)
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Appendix B: The Upper Level Organizations’ Official Web-Site

Organization
Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care:

Official website and/or staff consulted
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/

Local Health Integration Network:

http://www.lhins.on.ca/home.aspx

South West LHIN:

http://www.southwestlhin.on.ca/
Financial Reporting and Funding team Lead.

The International Society for Quality in
Health Care:
Accreditation Canada:

http://www.isqua.org/
http://www.accreditation.ca/en/
Health Services Research Specialist

Registered Nurses’ Association of
Ontario:

http://rnao.ca/
Senior Policy Analyst

Safer Healthcare Now:

Program Manager (in International Affairs and Best
Practice Guidelines Centre)
http://www.saferhealthcarenow.ca/EN/Pages/default.aspx

Canadian Patient Safety Institute:

http://www.patientsafetyinstitute.ca/English/Pages/default.aspx

The Acute Care Hospital

Patient Safety Specialist
Clinical Educator
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Appendix C: Fall Prevention Strategy as a ROP in Accreditation Process
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Appendix D: The Incident Management Continuum in Canadian Incident Analysis
Framework
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 Investigating issues of aging and fall among seniors
 Identifying seniors’ main concerns about their fall
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